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Can Peacebuilding Work?
Fen Osler Hampson*
Introduction
There is a new pessimism among scholars and practitioners about the
international community's ability to engage in successful peacebuilding
after civil conflicts.' Part of this pessimism stems from growing concerns
about the failure of the Dayton Peace Accord's implementors to get the par-
ties to honor their negotiated commitments. 2 The recent outbreaks of vio-
lence in Haiti, Cambodia and elsewhere also raise doubts about the
viability of international interventions aimed at restoring civic order, lay-
ing the groundwork for democracy, establishing the rule of law, and plac-
ing the economies of war-torn societies on sounder footing.
The image of peacebuilding is tarnished partly because of the confu-
sion that surrounds the concept itself. Some claim that the concept of
peacebuilding must include efforts to establish democratic institutions and
the rule of law because that is the only way to secure a lasting peace.3
Proponents of this position criticize many peacebuilding efforts as "fail-
ures" either because democracy is not restored (or established) in a coun-
try, and/or because the rule of law and elections for political office do not
meet Western standards. Others argue that including the establishment of
democratic institutions and the rule of law in the concept and mission of
peacebuilding sets unreasonably high standards for would-be
peacebuilders. They argue that such an approach distracts attention from
the more pressing tasks of physical, social, and economic reconstruction in
a post-conflict environment.
This paper discusses some of the problems and policy dilemmas asso-
ciated with these different conceptions of peacebuilding. It also discusses
* Professor, The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton
University, Ottawa, Canada.
1. See Roy Licklider, The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-
1993, 89 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 681, 685-87 (1995); StephenJohn Stedman, Spoiler Problems
in Peace Processes, INT'L SEcumRTY, Fall 1997, at 5; Chaim Kaufman, Possible and Impossi-
ble Solutions to Ethnic Wars, INT'L SEcuarM, Spring 1996, at 136; JohnJ. Mearsheimer &
Stephen Van Evera, Hateful Neighbors, N.Y. TImEs, Sept. 24, 1996, at A25; Roland Paris,
Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism, INr'L Sacunry, Fall 1997, at 54.
See also Benjamin Schwartz, The Diversity Myth: America's Leading Export, ATtANnc
MONTHLY, May 1995, at 57, 66-67.
2. Ivo H. Daalder, Bosnia After SFOR: Options for Continued US Engagement, SUR-
vivAL, Winter 1997-98, at 5; see also responses to Daalder from Carl Bildt, Pauline Nev-
ille-Jones and Robert A. Page in Id. at 19-28.
3. A useful review of these debates can be found in Pauline H. Baker, Conflict Reso-
lution Versus Democratic Governance: Divergent Paths to Peace, in MANAGING GLOBAL
CHAos: SOURCES OF AND RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL CoNFiICT 563-72 (Chester A.
Crocker & Fen Osler Hampson eds., 1996).
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the inherent tensions between short-term and long-term peacebuilding
tasks, and between peacebuilding which occurs within the framework of a
peace settlement and peacebuilding which does not. The paper argues that
although there are obvious tensions between conflict resolution and
democratization in war-torn societies, these tensions are not insurmounta-
ble. However, I do concede that there are serious difficulties associated
with a more comprehensive approach to peacebuilding, such as deciding
when to hold elections or how to promote the rule of law. We should be
careful about equating "success" in peacebuilding with the establishment
of a stable, democratic political order. Success in the area of peacebuilding
is always relative, and our expectations about what peacebuilders can do to
promote democratic governance should be modest and based on a realistic
appreciation of the difficulties of bringing about social, economic, and
political change in war-torn societies.
I. Definitions of Peacebuilding
Traditionally, peacebuilding covers a wide range of activities and functions
associated with political, social, and economic reconstruction in war-torn
societies. Former U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his
Agenda for Peace, defines peacebuilding as a broad set of activities which
"tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-
being among people."4 His list of peacebuilding activities includes: "dis-
arming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the cus-
tody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees,
[providing] advisory and training support for security personnel, monitor-
ing elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or
strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and infor-
mal processes of political participation."5
Although Boutros-Ghali suggests that the "United Nations has an obli-
gation to develop and provide ... support for the transformation of defi-
cient national structures and capabilities, and for the strengthening of new
democratic institutions," he also recognizes that the "authority of the
United Nations system to act in this field would rest on the consensus that
social peace is as important as strategic or political peace."6 However, Bou-
tros-Ghali leaves unanswered the question of how exactly the United
Nations and the international community might reach such a consensus.
Furthermore, in Agenda for Peace and in subsequent statements, the former
Secretary-General does not answer the questions of which of his list of
peacebuilding activities should be a priority and whether democratizing
initiatives should be advanced early on in the peace process.
4. An Agenda for Peace- Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping:
Report of the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR/SCOR, 47th Sess., Preliminary List Item 10,
at 55, U.N. Docs. A/47/277 & S/24111 (1992).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 59.
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If Boutros-Ghali's definition of peacebuilding seems broad, others have
argued for an even more expansive definition of the concept. Former Aus-
tralian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans defines peacebuilding as "a set of
strategies which aim to ensure that disputes, armed conflicts and other
major crises do not arise in the first place-or if they do arise, that they do
not subsequently recur."7 Evans suggests two broad groups of strategies:
international regimes and in-country peacebuilding measures. Interna-
tional regimes are "international laws, norms, agreements and arrange-
ments-[which are] global, regional, or bilateral in scope-designed to
minimize threats to security, promote confidence and trust and create
frameworks for dialogue and cooperation."8  In contrast, in-country
peacebuilding refers to national and international efforts "aimed at eco-
nomic development, institution building, and, more generally, the creation
or restoration within countries of the conditions necessary to make them
stable and viable states."9
Evans also identifies several conflict-prevention aspects of peacebuild-
ing. These include "non-military, economic, social and political measures
which can help states deal with emerging threats and disputes (for exam-
ple, measures to tackle problems associated with population pressures, or
with scarce water resources shared with a neighbor or with the absence of
telecommunications hot-lines to deal with border incidents)."' 0 Evans,
however, ignores the democratic governance aspects of peacebuilding
except to say that "'post conflict peace-building'... may involve rehabilita-
tion and reconstruction assistance ... and support for various kinds of
institution-building.... "11
Evans' conception of peacebuilding is too broad. He subsumes pre-
ventive diplomacy under the concept of peacebuilding so that "peacebuild-
ing" covers nearly every activity associated with the resolution and
prevention of interstate and intrastate conflict. Evans' conception blurs
operational distinctions among intervention actions directed at different
stages or levels of conflict. It also affects the prospects for "success"
because the broader the scope of the peacebuilding mission, the more
likely it is that one or more aspects of that mission will be "unsuccessful."
Another problem with Evans' conception is that it does not clearly explain
which kinds of interventions are going to be effective, nor does it indicate
when, where, and by whom an effective intervention may be carried out.
While it may be too restrictive to require a negotiated settlement prior
to engaging in peacebuilding, in effect making such a settlement a neces-
sary part of the concept of peacebuilding, the terms of an effectively negoti-
ated settlement can minimize the nature and extent to which peacebuilding
by external parties is necessary. There are often limits to what these exter-
7. GARETH EvANs, COOPERATING FOR PEACE: THE GLOBAL AGENDA FOR THE 1990s AND
BEYOND 9-10 (1993).
8. Id. at 9.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 9-10.
11. Id. at 10.
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nal parties can do and it is important to recognize and understand these
limits. In the absence of a settlement or a clearly defined mandate, the
operational difficulties associated with peacebuilding are formidable. Bou-
tros-Ghali offered a candid assessment of these problems in his Supplement
to an Agenda for Peace:
The more difficult situation is when post-conflict (or preventive) peace-
building activities are seen to be necessary in a country where the United
Nations does not already have a peacemaking or peace-keeping mandate.
Who then will identify the need for such measures and propose them to the
Government? If the measures are exclusively in the economic, social and
humanitarian fields, they are likely to fall within the purview of the resident
coordinator. He or she could recommend them to the Government. Even if
the resident coordinator has the capacity to monitor and analyze all the
indicators of an impending political and security crisis, however, which is
rarely the case, can he or she act without inviting the charge of exceeding his
or her mandate by assuming political functions, especially if the proposed
measures relate to areas such as security, the police, or human rights?
12
Such interventions, where there is no mandate, should probably be
avoided and almost certainly should not be called peacebuilding. This is
especially true when there is no peace to keep and there are only slim pros-
pects of achieving a political settlement. Additionally, a growing body of
evidence suggests that military and diplomatic interventions by the United
Nations or some other body are more likely to succeed when they are
linked to an existing genuine political settlement or to an ongoing, sus-
tained political process for obtaining one. 13
Humanitarian intervention in Somalia failed ibecause it lacked a polit-
ical context. 14 No bridge existed from the initial intervention to a political
process that could provide the basis for a successful operation and subse-
quent exit. Efforts to develop such a process were abandoned' 5 and this
diminished the impact of U.S. and U.N. intervention. In contrast, the more
successful international peace operations have occurred where a full-blown
settlement was implemented: El Salvador, Mozambique, Namibia, and,
until the collapse of the coalition government, Cambodia. 16 In these cases,
the provisions for both a cease-fire and a political settlement were exten-
sive, detailed, and, most importantly, were agreed to by all of the parties to
the conflict as well as by the concerned regional and global powers. 17 The
12. Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the
Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, U.N. GAOR/SCOR, 50th Sess.,
at 55, U.N. Docs. A/50/60 & S/1995/1 (1995).
13. See FEN OSLER HAMPSON, NURTURING PEACE: WHY PEACE SETTLEMENTS SUCCEED OR
FAIL 217-21 (1996).
14. See JOHN L. HIRSCH & ROBERT B. OAKLEY, SOMALIA AND OPERATION RESTORE HOPE:
REFLECTIONS ON PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING 158-61 (1995).
15. WilliamJ. Durch, Introduction to Anarchy: Humanitarian Intervention and "State-
Building" in Somalia, in U.N. PEACEKEEPING, AMERICAN POLITICS, AND THE UNCIVIL WARS OF
THE 1990s 311-66 (William J. Durch ed., 1996).
16. Chester A. Crocker & Fen Osler Hampson, Making Peace Solutions Work, FOR-
EIGN PoL'Y, Sept. 1, 1996, at 15.
17. HAMPSON, supra note 13, at 218-21.
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settlements provided for free and fair elections and for far-reaching reforms
of the judiciary and security institutions, producing fundamental change
in civilian-military relations.' 8 In these cases, the settlements also pro-
vided for demobilizing combatants and for taking steps towards national
reconciliation, particularly in the area of human rights. 19
A useful first step in understanding the ingredients for successful
peacebuilding is to draw a distinction between those activities which are
likely to help consolidate the peace in the immediate aftermath of a negoti-
ated settlement and those activities which are likely to ensure a lasting
peace. Some of these latter activities, discussed in the next sections, are
tied to security considerations, others to governance and democratization,
the restoration of political order, and the rule of law, and still others to
social and economic concerns.
II. Military and Security Challenges
The military and security components of peacebuilding are a critical part
of the peacemaking process. Peacekeeping-defined as the "use of interna-
tional military personnel, either in units or as individual observers, as part
of an agreed peace settlement or truce, generally to verify and monitor
cease-fire lines"2 0-remains essential to international efforts to prevent the
renewed outbreak of violence or military hostilities in a country. The early
deployment of peacekeepers helps develop confidence in the peace pro-
cess. However, as we are now seeing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, peacekeepers
may also be required to stay on the job for an extended period of time if the
situation remains unstable long after the settlement is signed.2 '
We should also note that the actual forms and functions of peacekeep-
ing have varied widely over the years. 22 The U.N. presence in Cyprus is
generally viewed as the classic model of a peacekeeping operation. How-
ever, the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has also been
involved in activities that go beyond "traditional" peacekeeping. In terms
of traditional peacekeeping, UNFICYP troops are deployed in a neutral
buffer zone that separates the island's two communities. Maintenance of
the buffer zone has been an important confidence-building measure and
has prevented accidental confrontations from escalating to greater levels of
conflict. 23 Going beyond "traditional" peacekeeping, UNFIYCP has pro-
vided assistance with food distribution, transportation, and maintenance
18. Paris, supra note 1, at 64-73.
19. On the important role played by the international community in advancing
human rights in El Salvador, see Fen Osler Hampson, The Pursuit of Human Rights: The
United Nations in El Salvador, in U.N. PEACEKEEPING, AMERICAN POLITICS, AND THE UNCIVIL
WARS OF THE 1990s 69-102 (William J. Durch ed., 1996).
20. Denis McLean, Peace Operations and Common Sense, in MANAGING GLOBAL CHAOS,
supra note 3, at 321.
21. See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, Albright Says Consensus Is Emerging on the Future of
U.S. Troops in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1997, at A8.
22. See generally THE EvOLUTION OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING (WilliamJ. Durch ed., 1993).
23. See Brian S. Mandell, The Cyprus Conflict: Explaining Resistance to Resolution, in
CYPRUS: A REGIONAL CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION 201, 221 (Norma Salem ed., 1992).
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of basic infrastructure such as power and water supplies.24
Although monitoring cease-fire provisions is a key element in any
peacekeeping/peacebuilding operation, another equally important func-
tion is assisting in the demobilization of local security forces. Demobiliza-
tion is "the process by which the armed forces (government and/or
opposition factional forces such as guerrilla armies) either downsize or
completely disband."25 A restructuring of the armed forces to include an
"ethnically and/or politically balanced 'national army,"' may also be part
of demobilization.26 Demobilization, disarmament, and restructuring of
armed forces are individually and collectively politically sensitive and chal-
lenging tasks. When they are not effectively undertaken, either because
they are not included in the initial negotiated settlement or because the job
is done poorly, the peace process has a greater chance of breaking down.
Evidence suggests that the generally more successful peace settle-
ments in El Salvador, Mozambique, and Namibia were achieved in part
because the complete or partial demobilization of forces occurred and
because some effort was made to reintegrate guerrilla factions into a
reformed military, and/or into the civilian sector.27 Where settlements
failed and various parties opted out of the peace process, as in the 1991
Bicesse accords in Angola,28 the suspension or collapse of demobilization
plans has been followed by the resumption of fighting.
The case of Cambodia illustrates the problems that arise when demo-
bilization plans go awry. Under the terms of the Paris Peace Accords for
Cambodia, the United Nations was to demobilize and disarm seventy per-
cent of each of the four factional armies and supervise the activities of the
remaining thirty percent before elections for a new constituent assembly.29
To help with this task, United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
(UNTAC) deployed nearly 16,000 military personnel.30 However, the
Khmer Rouge refused to participate in the peace process and repeatedly
failed to meet schedules for cantonment, demobilization, and disarma-
ment. This failure led to the eventual suspension of the second phase of
the demobilization program, leaving more than half a million Cambodians
24. See James H. Wolfe, The United Nations and the Cyprus Question, in CYPRUS: A
REGIONAL CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION 232 (Norma Salem ed., 1992); Adam Roberts,
The Crisis in U.N. Peacekeeping, in MANAGING GLOBAL CHAOS, supra note 3, at 300-02.
25. THE WORLD BANK, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL IN
AFRICA: THE EVIDENCE FROM SEVEN COUNTRY CASE STUDIES, Report No. IDP-130, at vi
(1993).
26. Id. at viii.
27. See Emc BERMAN, UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, MANAG-
ING ARMS IN PEACE PROCESSES: MOZAMBIQUE 77-81 (1996).
28. For an excellent account of the failure of the Bicesse Accords and peace process,
see MARGARET ANSTEE, ORPHAN OF THE COLD WAR: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF
ANGOLAN PEACE PROCESS, 1992-93 (1996).
29. See Letter Dated 30 October 1991 From the Permanent Representative of France
and Indonesia to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR/
SCOR, 46th Sess., Annex 2, Agenda Item 24, art. v, c 1, U.N. Doc. A/46/608 & S/23277
(1991).
30. See Carl Kaysen & George W. Rathjens, Send in the Troops: A U.N. Foreign
Legion, WASH. Q., Winter 1997, at 207.
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armed.31 Although legitimate national elections were held in an atmos-
phere that was generally free of violence and political intimidation, the sus-
pension of the demobilization plan mandated by the Paris agreements has
continued to plague the restoration of civilian rule in Cambodia.32
Similarly, the absence of comprehensive demobilization and disarma-
ment provisions in the Dayton Accord has perpetuated the existence of
three armies in Bosnia-Herzegovina-one in the Serb Republic and two
others in the Muslin-Croat federation. This has adversely affected the
implementation of the Accord.33 In the post-election drift towards parti-
tioning, the well-armed forces of all three sides present a continued threat
to political stability and inter-ethnic relations.
Demobilization and reintegration of former military personnel are key
peacebuilding objectives, but achieving them is a highly political process.
As a major study by the World Bank-notes:
[b]ecause DRP [demobilization and reintegration of military personnel] is
essentially a political process, particularly in countries emerging from civil
strife, the first step in determining whether investment in reintegration pro-
grams is warranted would be to assess the strength of the political settlement
preceding demobilization and the commitment of a key stakeholder, the mil-
itary. Appropriate economic incentives (such as demobilization allowance
and targeted reintegration programs) can facilitate the DRP process, but suf-
ficient political incentives are key to determining whether demobilization
will succeed.34
Such a process is ultimately linked to the specific terms of the political
settlement as well as to the commitment of previously warring parties to
abide by those terms.
III. "Proxy" Governance Challenges
Restoring the infrastructure and administrative capacity of a war-torn state
is a major challenge of peacebuilding. This challenge can be met by what
might be termed "proxy governance." Most civil conflicts take a severe toll
on the administrative and fiscal capacity of the state and its various institu-
tions. In a "proxy governance" undertaking, an external party3 5 takes over
some of the key administrative functions of the state until local authorities
are able to perform those functions themselves. Proxy governance can help
with the administration and governance of the State, contributing to a
more stable social, political, and economic order. However, proxy institu-
tions usually lack political legitimacy. Consequently, they lack the trust
31. See JANET E. HEININGER, PEACEKEEPING IN TRANSITION: THE UNmD NATIONS IN
CAMBODIA 37-38 (1994).
32. See UNrrED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DisAum 'NT RESEARCH, MANAGING ARMS IN
PEACE PROCESSES: CAMBODIA 22-30 (1996). Another reason for the failure to restore-civil-
ian rule in Cambodia was the inability of the two partners in the coalition government to
work effectively together. Id. at 46-56.
33. See Crocker & Hampson, supra note 16, at 15.
34. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 25, at 95.
35. Such as a non-governmental organization (NGO) or an international agency
such as the United Nations.
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and support of the people. As a result, they often have difficulty perform-
ing basic administrative tasks and providing essential services to the
people. 36
The term "proxy" describes well the functions of these external par-
ties, because they are temporary stand-ins for local authorities who are
unable or unwilling to perform the needed administrative tasks themselves.
Once the situation has stabilized and local authorities have the resources
and personnel to provide these services themselves, these responsibilities
generally are turned over to those local officials.
In Cambodia, proxy governance by UNTAC was extensive. The elec-
tions for a new Cambodian government were organized by UNTAC. 3 7 The
U.N. authority's civil administration unit also took over those government
bodies or agencies perceived as vulnerable to outside manipulation
because of the risk that control of the agencies would confer power to
influence the election process. The proxy-governed agencies included
those concerned with foreign affairs, national defense, finance, informa-
tion, and public security.3 8 Once the new government had been estab-
lished, UNTAC relinquished its control over these bodies.3 9
In Namibia, the United Nations Special Representative had extensive
review powers over the activities of the local South African Administrator-
General and helped draft electoral laws and plans for a Constituent Assem-
bly.4 ° In El Salvador, the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
(ONUSAL) was involved in reforming the judiciary, political institutions,
armed forces, and police. This involvement was quite extensive, going well
beyond ONUSAL's initial mandate.4 1 Various U.N.' agencies, such as the
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the United Nations
High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), also played key roles in helping
El Salvador with its social, political, and economic reforms. 4 2
However, the difficulties experienced by UNTAC's civil administration
unit in Cambodia indicate that proxy governance is a difficult undertaking.
Successful implementation of proxy governance can be hindered by:
delays in deployment; a third party's lack of familiarity with local condi-
tions; culture and forms of government; and the lack of a cease-fire which
can upset timetables and thwart cooperation among the parties. There is
also the danger that if the external parties become too involved in gov-
erning, they will be subject to charges of neocolonialism. The situation in
El Salvador, where the United Nations was criticized by some for over-
36. See Jarat Chopra, U.N. Civil Governance-in-Trust, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND
CIVIL WARs 69, 80-81 (Thomas G. Weiss ed., 1995).
37. See TREVOR FINDLAY, CAMBODIA: THE LEGACY AND LEsSONS OF UNTAC 15, 55-56
(1995).
38. Id. at 32.
39. Id. at 97.
40. See NATIONAL DEmocRATic INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, NATION BUILD-
ING: THE U.N. AND NAMIBIA 76-77 (1990).
41. See U.N. PEACEKEEPING, AMERICAN PouTics, AND THE UNCIVIL WARS OF THE 1990s,
supra note 15, at 88-95.
42. See HAMPSON, supra note 13, at 161, 232.
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staying its welcome, illustrates this risk.43 Furthermore, if outsiders
become too intrusive, they may actually weaken local infrastructure and
institutions rather than strengthening them.44 Therefore, it is important to
set clear and realistic peacekeeping and peacebuilding mandates that are
sensitive to local conditions, do not unduly compromise local sovereignty
and autonomy, and limit intervention to areas where the need is compel-
ling and mandates can be properly executed. Otherwise, outside efforts to
develop local governance structures will be counterproductive and possibly
self-defeating.
IV. Establishing Democracy and the Rule of Law
The third major challenge of peacebufilding is the development of demo-
cratic institutions and the establishment of the rule of law. This is perhaps
the most difficult challenge because this peacebuilding function directly
involves outsiders in the shaping of domestic institutions and political
practices. Understandably, this involvement is often perceived by the war-
torn nation as a threat to its sovereignty. Additionally, the challenge is at
the heart of both the relationship between peace and democracy and the
issue of whether a stable political order must also be a "just" one.
One of the major findings of social scientists who have examined the
relationship between peace and democracy in recent years is that there is a
strong, positive statistical correlation between peace and democratic polit-
ical institutions: democratic states are more likely to be internally stable
and less likely to engage in wars with other democratic states. 45 However,
the relationship between peace and democratization is far more problem-
atic. As Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder argue, there is also a strong
statistical correlation between states undergoing the transition to democ-
racy and the outbreak of war:
[C]ountries do not become mature democracies overnight. More typically,
they go through a rocky transitional period, where democratic control over
foreign policy is partial, where mass politics mixes in a volatile way with
authoritarian elite politics, and where democratization suffers reversals. In
this transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggres-
sive and war-prone, not less, and they do fight wars with democratic
states.
4 6
43. See Reed Brody, The United Nations and Human Rights in El Salvador's "Negotiated
Revolution," 8 HxAv. HUM. RTs. J. 153, 160-61 (1995).
44. See Eva Betram, Reinventing Governments: The Promise and Perils of United
Nations Peace Building, 39J. CoNn.. RES. 387, 390-93 (1995); Alvaro de Soto & Graciana
del Castillo, Obstacles to Peacebuilding, FoREIGN POL'Y, Spring 1994, at 69.
45. See, e.g., Michael Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics, 80 Am. POL. ScI. REv. 1151,
1151-69 (1986); BRUCE RussErr, GRASPING THE D MocRATic PRACE (1993); Bruce Russett,
And Yet It Moves (Bruce Russett on the Democratic Peace), Ir'L SECURITY, Spring 1995, at
164, 164-67.
46. Edward D. Mansfield & Jack Snyder, Democratization and the Danger of War,
INT'L SECURTY, Summer 1995, at 5.
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The reasons for this instability lie in the fact that popular appeals made by
the elites of society to mobilize the newly empowered masses are typically
based on a volatile mix of ideology and nationalism.
Mansfield and Snyder's findings have important implications for
peacebuilding efforts aimed at promoting democracy via elections, the for-
mation of political parties, and the process of democratization. In the
unstable social, economic and political environment of societies that are
coming out of a civil war, a too-rapid shift to democracy may actually prove
counterproductive if pressures for political participation cannot be accom-
modated by the newly created political institutions.47 The result may be
more rather than less political instability, resulting in an increased likeli-
hood of intercommunal violence and war.
The decision about when to hold elections in a recently pacified
nation illustrates some of these risks. In some circumstances, an election
becomes a deadline for an ethnic plebiscite. A poorly prepared and inade-
quately supervised election in Angola in 1992 was a major factor contribut-
ing to escalated warfare. 48 Separate elections in the republics of Yugoslavia
in 1990 empowered ethnic nationalists and paved the way for the intercom-
munal warfare that led to the breakup of the federated union.49 Also, the
Bosnian elections in 1996 arguably strengthened rather than weakened the
position of ethnic nationalists in the Muslim-Croat Federation and the
Republic of Srpska.50
Democratization efforts (whether sponsored externally or promoted
indigenously) need not have calamitous results. To avoid calamities, how-
ever, more attention has to be paid to the timing of elections and to pairing
elections with power-sharing formulas that promote stability amongst com-
peting political factions. There is strong circumstantial evidence to suggest
that power-sharing among winners and losers is conducive to successful
peacebuilding.51 Unless there is some form of compensation, those who
lose at the ballot box will have a strong incentive to take up arms again and
resort to force to achieve their political objectives. For example, the lack of
a power-sharing arrangement is one reason why the 1991 Bicesse Accords
in Angola fell apart.5 2 In contrast, the elections that followed the peace
settlement in Cambodia resulted in a coalition government between the
ruling Cambodian People's Party and the United National Front for an
Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia, which had
47. The classic exposition of this thesis is to be found in SAMuE. P. HUNTINGTON,
POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 140-91 (1968).
48. See HAMPSON, supra note 13, at 108-18.
49. See generally SusAN WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAOS AND DISSOLUTION AFTER
THE COLD WAR (1995).
50. SeeJames A. Schear, Bosnia's Post-Dayton Traumas, FOREIGN POLICY, Fall 1996, at
87, 96.
51. See, for example, Donald L. Horowitz, Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative
Politics for Ethnic Conflict Management, in CONFLICT AND PEACEMAKING IN MULTIETHNIC
SociE-nEs 451, 471 (Joseph V. Montville ed., 1991); Arned Lijphart, The Power Sharing
Approach, in id. 491 passim (1991).
52. See HAMPSON, supra note 13, at 89.
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won the popular vote.53 In Cambodia, the parties recognized early on that
a coalition government was necessary to appease rival factions and advance
the process of national reconciliation. 54
In the absence of power-sharing mechanisms or provisions to develop
inclusive coalitions, a settlement must at a minimum establish a level play-
ing field and give access to the political process to formerly excluded
groups. Everybody must have a sense that they can participate and that
the distribution of political power is. not zero-sum game.
When arguing for power-sharing arrangements, we must recognize
that there is no single formula or preferred model that can be taken "off the
shelf' and applied to any given country. Historically, a wide range of prac-
tices and approaches have been used in different power-sharing arrange-
ments.55 Generally, arrangements imposed from the outside do not work
as well as arrangements developed internally and tailored to local condi-
tions. For example, the power-sharing formula devised for Cyprus by Brit-
ish, Greek, and Turkish authorities in the 1959 Zurich-London Accords
resulted in a constitution that was too rigid to accommodate the conflicting
demands of Greek majority rule and Turkish minority rights.56 Also,
power-sharing arrangements better encourage democratic practices and
institutions when they are embraced by moderate political leaders who are
able to adapt when faced with conflicts between contending communal
interests.
On the issue of human rights, one of the unfortunate characteristics of
civil wars is the frequency of atrocities and human rights violations. To
fashion a new social order based on the rule of law and accepted principles
of justice, respect for human rights and due process in these institutions
must be nurtured. The security institutions of the state, namely, the armed
forces and the police, are usually suspected of the human rights violations
because many view them as instruments of state coercion of some or all of
the people.57 Reform of these institutions is usually fundamental to the
peace process and to the consolidation of democratic reforms. However,
the dismantling and/or reform of these institutions can lead to anarchy
and violence in a society that is unaccustomed to the rule of law and in
which elites feel threatened by the proposed democratic changes.58 Simi-
lar problems confront attempts to reform the judiciaries and legal systems
of recently pacified nations because some citizens see these institutions as
instruments of repression and state-sponsored violence.59
53. Id. at 199-200.
54. This is true even though the coalition later broke up when Hun Sen seized power
and threw out his coalition partner Crown Prince Norodom Ranariddh Sihanouk. See
Cambodia's Bitter Partnership, THE ECONoMisT, Feb. 1, 1997, at 37.
55. See TIMOTHY D. SISK, POWER SHARING AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION IN ETHNIc
CONFLICTS 77-86 (1996).
56. See CHARLEs FOLEY & W.L SCOBIE, THE STRUGGLE FOR CYPRUS 160-63 (1975).
57. See HAMPSON, supra note 13, at 229.
58. See id. at 21.
59. See id. at 229.
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In El Salvador, the deployment of ONUSAL's human rights monitoring
team before the fighting had ended and the final accords were signed
helped instill a sense of confidence among the parties to El Salvador's nas-
cent peace process.60 ONUSAL investigated situations involving human
rights violations and followed up on these investigations with relevant par-
ties in the Salvadoran government. 6 1 ONUSAL also developed regional and
local contacts with the main political, judicial, and military authorities,
and maintained ongoing contact with the guerilla resistance movement's
(FMLN) leaders inside the country. 62 By working closely with local
human rights organizations, ONUSAL was able to design a human rights
program for the armed forces, a group responsible for some of the worst
human rights abuses in the country.6 3 Third parties can help advance the
cause of justice by putting parties on notice that certain actions and behav-
iors will not be tolerated and that human rights violations will be pun-
ished. The El Salvador experience illustrates that the promotion of human
rights early in the peacebuilding process serves as an important confi-
dence-building measure during later negotiation of a formal settlement.
There is an obvious tension between conflict resolution on the one
hand, and, on the other, the promotion of human rights, judicial reform,
and the development of legal systems governed by due process. Peace and
justice do not always work in tandem. The need to establish power sharing
structures that accommodate rival factions and interests may well clash
with the desire to punish perpetrators of human rights abuses. Similarly,
the need to reform the police and the military may be at odds with the
practical need to bring those powerful groups into the peace process.
Without peace there can be no justice. Without justice, democratic institu-
tions, and the rule of law, the peace will not last. However, the political
requirements for reaching a peace settlement may clash with the desire to
lay the foundations for long-term democratic stability. These potential
compromises prompt the question of which model works best in a given
situation, the power-sharing conflict manager's model, 64 or the democra-
tizer's political justice model?65 Empirical evidence suggests that a con-
cern for justice must be tempered by the realities of negotiation and by the
parties' interests in reaching a political settlement.
In Cambodia, for example, implementation of the human rights provi-
sions in the Paris Peace Accords was weak, not only because of the practical
60. See id. at 167.
61. See id. at 138-39.
62. See id. at 149.
63. See id. at 150; United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador: Report of the Secre-
tary-General, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., '1 4, U.N. Doc. S/23642 (1992).
64. See generally ELUSIVE PEACE: NEGOTIATING AN END TO CIVIL WARS (I. William
Zartman ed., 1995); DONALD K. HOROwiTz, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT (1985); SISK,
supra note 55; David A. Lake & Donald Rothchild, Containing Fear: The Origins and
Management of Ethnic Conflict, INT'L SECURITY, Fall 1996, at 41.
65. See generally TRANSrnONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH
FORMER REGIMES 82-103, 292-334, 375-438 (NeilJ. Kritz ed., 1995). For a skeptical view
of this model, see Timothy D. Mak, The Case Against an International War Crimes Tribu-
nal for Former Yugoslavia, 2 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 536 (1995).
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difficulties of implementation, but also because "more vigorous pursuit of
human rights goals ran the risk of upsetting the delicate political balance
that was necessary if the elections were to take place."66 Moreover, in "a
country with a history of human rights abuses that approached genocide, it
was going to be an uphill task to educate the population, to develop indige-
nous human rights organizations, and most [importantly], to develop
mechanisms that would truly protect the peoples from human rights
abuses."67 That being said, by opting out of the elections, the Khmer
Rouge, which was guilty of the worst human rights in Cambodia, isolated
itself and weakened its own political position.68
In El Salvador, all of the parties were sensitive to the need to address
human rights problems at the outset of the peace process. 69 The success of
the Salvadoran peace process is largely attributable to the fact that political
reform was linked to the promotion of human rights and to the accounta-
bility of those who were guilty of the worst human rights abuses.70 How-
ever, given the volatile conditions in El Salvador and the fact that the local
efforts to investigate human rights abuses were not feasible or credible,
international authorities were needed to evaluate and assess the evidence
assembled by local interests.71 The Truth Commission helped to develop
greater local confidence in the peace process and bolstered efforts to
reform the judicial system and the security institutions of the state.72
However, the slow pace of judicial reform in El Salvador reflects the fact
that significant obstacles to such reforms remain.
Other examples of the compromises necessary to enact reforms
abound. In Namibia, all parties recognized the need to both develop strong
democratic institutions based on the rule of law and to entrench minority
rights in the Constitution.73 In Cambodia, the question of accountability
for war crimes committed during the Pol Pot regime was controversial and
was further complicated by the struggle for political power between Hun
Sen and Ranariddh Sihanouk. 74 The decision by the Cambodian govern-
ment to grant amnesty to some senior members of the Khmer Rouge
showed that the government prioritized accountability for war crimes and
genocide behind political stability and national reconciliation. 75 NATO's
unwillingness to round up those charged with war crimes in Bosnia at the
point when the Implementation Force (IFOR) had strength on the ground
66. See JANET E. HImNENGE, PEACEKEEPING IN TRAmsITION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN
CAMBODIA 39 (1994).
67. See id.
68. See FINDLAY, supra note 37, at 87.
69. See HAMPSON, supra note 13, at 138-40.
70. See id.
71. See United Nations Observer Mission, supra note 63.
72. See Mark Ensalaco, Truth Commissions for Chile and El Salvador: A Report and
Assessment, 16 HuM. RTs. Q. 656 (1994).
73. See HAMPSON, supra note 13, at 69.
74. See Accounting for War Crimes in Cambodia, PEACE WATCH, (United States Insti-
tute of Peace, Wash., D.C.), Oct. 1995, at 2.
75. See Nayan Chanda, Cambodia: Face the Facts: Interview, Inside Account Links
leng Sary to Killings, FAR EAsgmN EcON. REv., Sept. 26, 1996, at 22.
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adversely affected the peace process and, in the eyes of some, represented a
lost opportunity. The failure to address these human rights concerns has
further undermined the credibility of the international community and, in
particular, those responsible for implementing the Dayton Accord.
The problem in any settlement process is not how to resolve the theo-
retical tension between human rights, democracy, and power sharing. It is
how to work with parties who are reluctant to enter into a settlement that
provides significant protection for human rights. The initial challenge for
third parties is to advance the cause of human rights without undermining
the settlement itself. Once the political situation has stabilized, the chal-
lenge remains to foster institutional mechanisms that will advance human
rights and democratic development. Third parties should play a substan-
.tial role in investigating human rights abuses and other war crimes. They
should also evaluate evidence assembled by local authorities before arrests
for human rights violations are made. In the fragile political climate that
exists following a settlement, the temptation for retribution and revenge are
considerable. International commissions and tribunals bring an element
of impartiality that is necessary to restore faith in the judicial process and
in the rule of law. It is unwise and unreasonable to expect parties to be
able to establish or re-establish the rule of law and due process on their
own. Therefore, peacebuilding must prioritize third party involvement in
this aspect of the peace process.7 6
V. Social and Economic Challenges
A stable economy and the developed infrastructure upon which it rests are
important to the effective performance of representative government.
Therefore, successful long-term peacebuilding requires maintenance or
development of the infrastructure and economy of a post-conflict nation.
International development agencies and nongovernmental organizations
can make signficant contributions to this particular aspect of post-conflict
peacebuilding.
Economic reconstruction involving major infrastructure projects takes
months to plan, years to implement, and a level of resources that most non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) cannot provide. Hence, the World
Bank and the regional banks, like the Inter-American Development Bank,
play a crucial role in economic reconstruction. These banks can provide
loans and lines of credit as well as coordinate reconstruction aid.7 7 The
coordination of donor efforts is increasingly recognized as a fundamental
ingredient for successful peacebuilding, even though such coordination is
difficult to achieve because of turf battles among competing agencies. 78
Leadership is necessary to establish priorities in social and economic
76. On the issue of how new societies can redress past abuses and develop the rule
of law, see generally TRANSInONA JUSTICE, supra note 65.
77. See NICOLE BALL & TIMOTHY HALEVY, MAING PEACE WORK: THE ROLE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CoMMuNITY 81-102 (1996).
78. See id.
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reconstruction efforts and to channel scarce resources to where they will be
most effective. But cooperation between donor countries and greater levels
of NGO cooperation will accomplish little unless the local security environ-
ment is conducive to reconstruction. To be effective, reconstruction and
development require a threshold level of security and political order.
While some development assistance projects can promote confidence-
building and improve social relations at the community level, others may
worsen social and political relations if certain groups are "privileged" -i.e.
seen to be getting scarce resources at the expense of others.79 Thus, to be
effective in advancing the peace process, development assistance programs
have to be established with sensitivity to local conditions.
There are various views about when and how donors should become
involved in the peacebuilding process. Nicole Ball argues that
[d]uring the negotiation phase, a relatively modest amount of resources
should be devoted to planning and to building collaborative relationships
with the parties to the conflict. The speed with which events occur once
peace agreements are signed argues very strongly in favor of donor involve-
ment at the earliest possible moment in the peace process.80
One of the principal reasons why Ball feels that donors should play a larger
role in the negotiation process is that this allows economic issues to be
dealt with in a "realistic manner" and helps to downgrade expectations by
determining what levels of assistance will be available and forthcoming
from potential donors.8 1 Ball also recognizes the importance of tying eco-
nomic and development assistance and programs in war-torn societies to a
negotiated peace settlement. 82 This further underscores the point made
above that peacebuilding activities cannot and should not be carried out in
a political vacuum. The real test is whether the parties to the conflict them-
selves are willing to live up to the terms of a negotiated political settlement
and to allow post-conflict reconstruction efforts to move forward. If the
parties are not, then all of the assistance in the world will achieve little in
the way of social and economic reconstruction.
Conclusion
The concept of peacebuilding is problematic, in part because of the overly
expansive definition given to the concept of peacebuilding. Including in
the definition every activity associated with the prevention, management,
and resolution of conflict has created considerable conceptual and opera-
tional confusion. As argued here, the concept of peacebuilding should be
linked to the notion of a political settlement and to the idea that there is a
peace to be kept and a political process to build upon.
79. Id. at 83-84.
80. Nicole Ball, The Challenge of Rebuilding War-Torn Societies, in MANAGING GLOBAL
CHAos, supra note 3, at 613.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 621-22.
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A second and related difficulty with the concept stems from the defini-
tion of "success." At issue is what constitutes successful peacebuilding.
For some, the peacebuilding process must produce a set of arrangements
that lasts for years (perhaps generations). The problem with this definition
is one of infinite regress-that is, exactly when do we conclude definitively
that a peace settlement has succeeded? Using this definition, we can never
reach such a conclusion because the prospect of failure is always just
around the corner. Because success is relative, it is perhaps more useful
(certainly in operational terms) to measure success at different phases or
stages of the peace process. Because the renunciation of violence by war-
ring factions is clearly a necessary precondition for the restoration of polit-
ical order, the definition of success begins with the ending of civil violence
and armed confrontation. But success, in this sense, is only partial. For a
settlement to be durable, institutions and support structures must be put in
place so that the parties are discouraged from taking up arms again.
Further or continued success is thus associated with the comprehen-
siveness and durability of confidence-building measures that are put in
place during the post-settlement, or peacebuilding, phase. Beyond keeping
the peace itself, the list of tasks includes (1) demobilizing armed forces on
all sides; (2) reintegrating combatants and displaced populations into the
society and economy of a country; (3) redefining the role of military and
police forces in the maintenance of law and order via judicial and institu-
tional reforms which advance the rule of law; (4) building communities
and allowing them to survive by oordinating short-term emergency assist-
ance and long-term development assistance; and (5) addressing the needs
of particularly vulnerable sectors and groups in society, such as women
and children.
The ultimate success of the peacebuilding process in situations of civil
conflict is thus directly related to a society's ability to make the transition
from a state of war to a state of peace marked by the restoration of civil
order, the reemergence of civil society, and the establishment of par-
ticipatory political institutions. However, we must recognize that this pro-
cess takes many years and that democratization is fraught with risk. These
risks are not insurmountable but prudence is desirable. The fact that we
now seem to be entering a period of diminished expectations about the
prospects and possibilities of peacebuilding should not deter us from the
challenges of rebuilding war-torn societies. Not only can external parties,
both governmental and non-governmental, make a difference, but the
demands for such assistance are likely to grow, not diminish, in the years
ahead.
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